But then we hit questions like: if someone loses a limb, are they still the same person? Most of us would say yes, which suggests the “self” isn’t just physical. Maybe it’s in the mind? That’s what Descartes thought with his famous line, “I think, therefore I am.” He believed the body could be broken down, but the mind was indivisible and enduring (Gorham, as cited in Campbell & Silverstein, 2010).

But what about conditions like Alzheimer’s or dementia? The brain physically changes, and people lose memories, personality traits—even the sense of who they are. So if both the body and mind can change or decay, what part of us stays constant? Where does the “real” self live?

Science tells us our cells die off and regenerate over time, so eventually, we’re not made of the same physical matter. Meanwhile, our thoughts, values, and beliefs also shift with time and experience. And yet, we still feel like the same “me”, therefore perhaps the self is not entirely coming from within, but also from external factors too?

Some philosophers, like Mari Ruti (2006), challenge the idea that we’re entirely shaped by society or culture. If we’re just a product of outside influences, how do we explain those moments when we push back—when we disagree with what’s expected of us? Ruti suggests there might be something deeper—an inner essence, or soul, that isn’t completely shaped by the world around us. Something that uses our body and mind to interact with life, but isn’t defined by them. She argues this internal essence allows for “creative agency, psychic transformation, and the subject’s dynamic relationship to the socio-symbolic structures that surround it” (Ruti, as cited in Carmody, 2019, p. 197).

This soul, or essence, allows us to grow, adapt, and connect with others without being entirely dependent on external factors. And unlike the body or mind, some argue it can’t die. According to Gorham (as cited in Campbell & Silverstein, 2010), the body can perish, but the soul is said to be immortal.

But then again, if the soul lives on, can the dead still be affected? Philosopher Levenbook (as cited in Campbell & Silverstein, 2010) asks: can we harm someone who has passed away? If not, maybe nothing of them remains. But if yes, then something of their self still exists—so what is it?

We also ask: are we still the same person we were 10 or 20 years ago? People often say things like “I’m not who I was back then.” So at what point do we become someone new? Philosopher Ned Markosian (as cited in Campbell & Silverstein, 2010) poses the question of what criteria we use to decide whether someone is still the same person over time.

Then there’s this beautiful idea from psychiatrist Irvin Yalom (2008)—the “rippling effect.” It’s the notion that every interaction we have affects someone else. We might say something or do something that changes the course of someone’s life, even in a small way. They carry that change into the world, and it spreads. In that sense, part of us lives on in others, long after we’re gone.

But then, if others carry a version of us with them, does their perception become the “real” us? Is the self we think we are more valid, or is it the version people remember? Philosopher David Hume famously claimed that the self is really just a “bundle of perceptions” (Perry, as cited in Campbell & Silverstein, 2010). So maybe there isn’t one fixed “you,” just a constantly shifting experience that depends on context, memory, and interpretation.

So—who are you?

Are you your body?

Your thoughts?

Your soul?

Who you are right now?

Or are you who others say you are?

Maybe it’s all of the above.

About the Author – Who Am I?
This post was written by Alan Dignam, a psychotherapist and doctoral candidate in psychotherapy at Dublin City University. Alan is an accredited member of the Irish Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy (IACP) and lectures in psychotherapy at IICP College.

Before training as a psychotherapist, Alan spent 13 years working in the corporate IT sector as a software developer. His career change was driven by a deep interest in human experience and emotional wellbeing, which now informs his integrative and relational approach to psychotherapy.

Alan works in private practice with individuals aged 16 and over, supporting a broad range of psychological and emotional concerns. He has a particular interest in identity development, and frequently works with student therapists as part of their personal and professional growth. His clinical focus also includes working with gender, sexual, and relationship diverse (GSRD) clients, as well as neurodivergent individuals.

His previous academic research explored topics such as gay male monogamy and LGBT+ clients’ experiences of therapy. His current doctoral research focuses on the psychotherapy experiences of neurodivergent transgender people.

References
Burkitt, I. 1999. Bodies of Thought. Embodiment, Identity and Modernity, London: Sage Publications.
Campbell, J. & Silverstein, H. (2010) Time and Identity, MIT Press.

Carmody, M. (2019) Educating souls, selves, or minds? ProQuest Ebook Central

Crease, R. P. 2002. The pleasure of popular dance. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, XXIX (2): 106–120.

Gill, J. H. 2000. The Tacit Mode, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. 1999. Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought, New York: Basic Books Perseus Book Group.

Ruti, M. (2006). Reinventing the soul: Posthumanist theory and psychic life. New York, NY: Other Press.

Sartre, J.-P. 1957. Being and Nothingness, London: Methuen. translated by Hazel Barnes

Schwegler, A. (1887). Socrates. In A history of philosophy in epitome., Rev. from the 9th German ed., with an appendix. (pp. 62–78). D Appleton & Company.

Whitehead, M. (2008). Physical Literacy: Philosophical Considerations in Relation to Developing a Sense of Self, Universality and Propositional Knowledge. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy

Yalom, I. (2008). Staring at the sun overcoming the terror of death. Jossey-Bass